Copeland v. Texas, 3-18-2020

A grand jury indicted Appellant, Draden Heath Copeland, on four counts of theft and one count of evading arrest or detention. All five counts included an enhancement paragraph alleging prior felony convictions. Copeland pleaded guilty to all five offenses and “true” to the allegations of prior convictions. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court found all the enhancement allegations true and assessed punishment at twenty years of confinement on the four counts of theft and forty years of confinement on the count of evading arrest or detention, with the sentences to run concurrently. Copeland timely filed an appeal.

Copeland’s first issue on appeal argues that his convictions on four counts of theft constitute multiple punishments for the same offense and violate the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend. V; Tex. Const. art. I, § 14. Copeland did not assert a claim of double jeopardy in the trial court. In Gonzalez v. State, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that double jeopardy claims could be forfeited by procedural default—simply by failing to make an objection at trial. 8 S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). However, there is an exception which allows a double jeopardy claim to be raised for the first time on appeal when two conditions are met: (1) the undisputed facts show a double jeopardy violation is apparent on the face of the record; and (2) enforcement of the usual rules of procedural default serves no legitimate state interest. Id. Here, we cannot say that a double jeopardy claim is apparent from the face of the record. Therefore, the exception does not apply, and Copeland forfeited by procedural default his double jeopardy claim.

Copeland’s second issue argues that evading arrest in a vehicle should have been classified as a state jail felony and that by sentencing him to a third-degree felony, the trial court imposed a sentence in Count 5 that was not authorized by law. We conclude that Copeland’s sentence for evading arrest or detention as a third-degree felony was proper, and we overrule Copeland’s second issue. See Sneed, 2014 WL 4755502, at *4; Adetomiwa, 421 S.W.3d at 926-27.

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Warrantless Searches of Vehicles in Texas-The Automobile Exception to the 4th Amendment

An opinion was just released by the 9th Court of Appeals in Texas that explains when an officer may search your vehicle and why in Texas.

Here is the applicable discussion

Applicable Law

Pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a warrantless search is per se unreasonable unless it falls within an exception to the requirement for a warrant. Arizona v. Gant , 556 U.S. 332, 338  (2009); McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609, 615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The “automobile exception” allows for the warrantless search of a vehicle “if it is readily mobile and there is probable cause to believe that it contains contraband.” see Marcopoulos v. State, 538 S.W.3d 596, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Keehn v. State , 279 S.W.3d 330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982) (police may search a vehicle if they have probable cause to believe it contains evidence of a crime)...See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391-92 (1985)(explaining that the “automobile exception” to the requirement of a warrant applies when a vehicle is being used on the highways). Probable cause exists when “the facts and circumstances within the knowledge of the arresting officer and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information would warrant a reasonable and prudent man in believing that a particular person has committed or is committing a crime." Brown v. State, 481 S.W.2d 106, 110 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); see also Amores v. State, 816 S.W.2d 407, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). “Probable cause requires an evaluation of probabilities, and probabilities ‘are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’” Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24(quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)). If the totality of the circumstances demonstrate a “fair probability” of finding evidence at the location being searched, then the probable cause standard is met. Dixon v. State, 206 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). A court may consider “the training, knowledge, and experience of law enforcement officials” involved in the warrantless search. See Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 25. Only a “minimal level of objective justification” on the part of the officer is required, and our “determination of reasonable suspicion must be based upon commonsense judgments and inferences about human behavior.” See Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 17 (1989)(quoting Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Dalgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984)).